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Abstract 
 
Benchmarking and peer review are essential elements of the so-called EU open method of 
coordination (OMC) which has been contested in the literature for lack of effectiveness. In this paper 
we compare benchmarking and peer review procedures as used by the EU with those used by the 
OECD. Different types of benchmarking and peer review are distinguished and pitfalls for 
(international) benchmarking are discussed. We find that the OECD has a clear single objective for its 
benchmarking and peer review activities (i.e. horizontal policy transfers) whereas the EU suffers from 
a mix of objectives (a. horizontal policy learning; b. EU wide vertical policy coordination and c. 
multilateral monitoring and surveillance under the shadow of hierarchy). Whereas the OECD is able 
to skirt around most of the benchmarking pitfalls, this is not the case for the EU. It is argued that, 
rather than continue working with the panacea OMC benchmarking and peer review currently 
represents, EU benchmarking should take a number of more distinct shapes in order to improve 
effectiveness. Moreover, in some areas benchmarking and peer review are not sufficient coordination 
tools, and are at best additional to those means of coordination that include enforceable sanctions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Benchmarking and peer review are an essential element of the EU’s open method of 
coordination (OMC). They are applied in order to stimulate mutual learning processes, 
to perform multilateral surveillance and to contribute to further convergence of 
Member States’ policies, in various policy fields. However, the current use of 
benchmarking within the OMC suffers from two main flaws (Groenendijk, 2008). First, 
OMC benchmarking approaches and practices are generally poorly designed and 
overlook the fact that different purposes and contexts call for different types of 
benchmarking; more generally, different coordination issues need different 
procedures (Heise, 2008). Secondly, in some areas (especially in social policies) 
benchmarking may not be a sufficient coordination tool, and it is at best additional to 
those means of coordination that include enforceable sanctions. 
 
Systematic comparison of the EU and organisations like the IMF and the OECD is 
largely absent, with the notable exception of Schäfer (2006). The main finding of 
Schäfer is that OMC procedures are far from novel and partly resembles multi-lateral 
surveillance procedures as used by the IMF and by the OECD. In this paper we 
compare the use of benchmarking and peer review (hereafter: B&PR) by the EU with 
the use of these tools by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The OECD has ample experience with the application of 
benchmarking and peer review procedures. It also uses these tools in order to 
achieve greater policy convergence among its members and to contribute to improved 
domestic policy making. Although the nature of the OECD differs significantly from 
that of the EU, a comparison of the application of B&PR tools by the EU and the OECD 
can be useful to explore differences and similarities and to draw suggestions for 
improvement of OMC BPR, also taking into account that the OECD has over 40 years 
of experience whereas within the EU B&PR is relatively new. Moreover, the OECD’s 
role in the growing networks of transnational economic governance seems to be 
under-emphasised (Mahon and McBride, 2009). Compared to other international 
organisations that operate within the field of (global) economic governance (like the 
IMF and the World Bank Group) it is regarded as an organisation that is relatively 
open, far from monolithic and adaptive (Mahon and McBride, 2009). 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 public sector benchmarking is 
discussed and an analytical framework for our comparison is put forward. In section 3 
the BPR tools as used by the EU and the OECD are briefly described and they are 
compared in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Public sector benchmarking & peer review 
 
Benchmarking was originally developed in private sector management. With the rise 
of New Public Management (i.e. the increased application of insights from public 
sector management to the public sector) public sector performance management 
and/or benchmarking has also advanced. Performance management and/or 
benchmarking in the public sector can be used for different reasons. It can be used to 
improve performance, for resource allocation (i.e. to base budgets on), and to 
improve accountability. Ultimately, performance management and/or benchmarking 
in the public sector aims (just as the New Public Management in general) at improving 
the efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of government intervention. 
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2.1 Various types of benchmarking 
 
Before we have a closer look at different types of public sector benchmarking, we 
should discuss some of the major characteristics of benchmarking. Because 
benchmarking can be done in various ways, it is hard to come up with a singular 
definition that covers all variations. Rather than going into the discourse on defining 
benchmarking, let us discuss these various ways (following Schütz, Speckesser and 
Schmid, 1998; Dattakumar and Jagadeesh, 2003; Bowerman et al., 2002: 431-433 
and Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004): 
a. Benchmarking can be internal or external. Internal benchmarking involves units or 
sub-units of the same entitiy; external benchmarking seeks to compare entities 
with the same or very similar characteristics; 
b. External benchmarking can be competitive or non-competitive (or: cooperative). 
Competitive benchmarking is aimed at getting a competitive edge over rival 
entities, non-competitive benchmarking is not and is basically about “learning 
from others”; 
c. A related distinction within internal benchmarking is that between benchmarking 
as learning (aimed at improvement) and disciplinary benchmarking (as means of 
hierarchical control). Linked to this is the distinction between bottom-up and top-
down benchmarking; 
d. Benchmarking can be functional or generic. Functional benchmarking involves the 
comparative analysis of specific aspects of the entities involved (specific tasks, 
functions or processes), independently of output, sector, branch, market segment, 
size et cetera. With functional benchmarking it is assumed that –as far as these 
aspects are concerned- entities are comparable. The more aspects this is true for, 
the more functional benchmarking moves into the direction of generic 
benchmarking. In its purest form, generic benchmarking involves all aspects of 
the entities involved; 
e. Standards benchmarking, results benchmarking and process benchmarking. 
Standards benchmarking involves setting a standard of performance that an 
effective entity (or part thereof) could be expected to achieve. Results 
benchmarking refers to comparing the performance of a number of entities (or 
parts thereof) providing a similar service, and process benchmarking refers to 
undertaking a detailed examination within a group of entities (or organisational 
units) of the processes which produce a particular output, with a view to 
understanding the reasons for variations in performance. It is easy to see that 
results benchmarking only is not very worthwhile. Results benchmarking should 
always be accompanied by some degree of process benchmarking. 
 
The distinction between (external) competitive benchmarking and (internal) 
disciplinary benchmarking on the one hand and cooperative benchmarking 
(benchmarking as learning) on the other hand is an important one, because the two 
are easily mixed up (as they are indeed in the OMC, as will be discussed in the next 
section). If two organisations are involved in benchmarking, are they partners or 
adversaries? One could think of examples of benchmarking where there is no 
competition between the organisations involved. Typically, external functional 
benchmarking between organisations that operate in different sectors (for instance, 
benchmarking catering services in hospitals, museums and universities) is not 
competitive. External functional benchmarking between competitors obviously is, but 
the same often goes for internal disciplinary benchmarking (especially when linked to 
budgetary decisions). It all depends on the nature of the parties’ independence, 
whether they are vertically linked (by working as agents for the same principal) or 
horizontally linked (through engagement in a common task or through competition). 
With competitive benchmarking the aim is superiority, the nature of the relationship is 
competitive, and the actions to be taken are unilateral. With cooperative 
benchmarking the aim is learning, there is partnership and collaboration, and joint 
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action (Wolfram Cox et al., 1997:289-291). Wolfram Cox et al. (1997) subsequently 
use the term benchMARKING for competitive benchmarking and BENCHmarking for 
cooperative benchmarking. 
 
 
2.2 Three types of public sector benchmarking 
 
A distinction can be now made between three types of benchmarking in the public 
sector (Groenendijk, 2008: 16-17). First, there is the benchmarking of public sector 
organisations. Secondly there is benchmarking of public policies, and thirdly there is 
benchmarking of policy systems. 
 
In principle, benchmarking of public sector organisations is very similar to private 
sector benchmarking. In fact, most of the benchmarking done in the public sector is 
of the organisational kind. In spite of the communality between benchmarking in the 
two sectors, Bowerman et al. (2002: 433-435) have put forward three characteristics 
that distinguish private sector benchmarking from that which takes place in the public 
sector: 
a. private sector benchmarking clearly has best practices as its primary focus, 
whereas in the public sector organisations may strive to be ‘good enough’ or 
simply to demonstrate that they are not the worst; 
b. private sector benchmarking is an internal management tool and application of 
that tool by management is voluntary. In the public sector, benchmarking is often 
imposed upon organisations through a certain hierarchical structure, either as part 
of the budgeting process and/or public audit procedures, or politically driven. In 
these cases benchmarking has a clear compulsory edge. The distinction that is 
sometimes made between top-down benchmarking (where benchmarking is 
applied externally) and bottom-up benchmarking (where organisations benchmark 
themselves) is especially relevant to the public sector (Lundvall and Tomlinson, 
2002: 213) and the ‘ownership’ of the benchmarking process is a crucial feature. 
The problem with compulsory benchmarking is that it leads to a concentration on 
the measurable results and indicators rather than on ‘real’ performance which will 
result in dysfunctional behaviour, assuming that there is no set of indicators that 
can fully capture performance (because –after all- indicators at best measure –
some of- the essential elements of performance); 
c. information in the private sector is and can be kept confidential, whereas in the 
public sector benchmarking is inherently linked to accountability and there is a 
growing aspiration to openness and transparency. 
 
Benchmarking public policies (the second type of public sector benchmarking) has no 
counterpart in the private sector, simply because private sector organisations are not 
interested in the far-off outcomes of their activities but merely in their output related 
in financial terms to their input (i.e. making profits, in pursuance of financial 
continuity). 
Policy outcomes (like economic growth, unemployment et cetera) are however the 
result of numerous activities by various actors, which has serious implications for the 
benchmarking process. Ideally, benchmarking should focus on these aspects that are 
within the span-of-control of the leadership of the entities involved. This is exactly 
why within the private sector (functional) benchmarking is so popular. If a company 
has several factories which produce the same products, and the performance of these 
factories is compared, those aspects that are out of control of factory management 
but which are identical (for instance a rise in the price of raw materials on the world 
market, or a looming recession), are not relevant to the (relative) comparison and do 
not have to be dealt with. Still, there have to be differences; otherwise the whole 
operation would not make any sense. As the French saying has it: “comparaison n’est 
pas raison”. There is a paradox in every comparison. What is different cannot be 
 
 
GROENENDIJK = EU AND OECD BENCHMARKING AND PEER REVIEW COMPARED = EUCE, HALIFAX, APRIL 26-28, 2009 
5 
compared, but only what is different is worth comparing (paraphrasing Löwe, 2003: 
4). 
To a certain extent, this issue is related to the issue of the scale of the benchmarking 
process, and the distinction between external and internal benchmarking. With 
internal benchmarking, the environment in which the different entities operate is 
identical, and external factors cannot be blamed for performance gaps. The smaller 
the scale of the benchmarking, the more of these external factors can be put in this 
irrelevant background and the easier it is to focus on those factors that really do 
make a difference. The larger the scale, the more these factors are internalised and 
have to be dealt with in the benchmarking process itself. It is easier to benchmark 
public libraries in a certain region in country x, than to carry out a worldwide 
benchmarking of public libraries. Functional benchmarking can therefore be seen as 
the reduced form of generic benchmarking, by reducing larger units to smaller –
comparable- entities. On top of that, there is a difference between benchmarking 
organisational output and policy outcomes. It is far easier to benchmark the 
performance of public libraries than to benchmark illiteracy, just as it is easier to 
benchmark different organisations involved in vocational training than to benchmark 
unemployment. The more complicated benchmarking gets, the less likely it is that we 
can rely on standards or results benchmarking only, and the more imperative it is 
that we go into the processes that contribute to performance (process 
benchmarking). 
 
Finally, there is benchmarking of policy systems. Examples are national innovations 
systems (Lundvall and Tomlinson, 2002) or national welfare state regimes. The 
problem here is that such systems deal with a multitude of policy objectives whereas 
benchmarking of policies (ideally) involves a single set of coherent policy objectives. 
The first –and often fatal- obstacle in benchmarking policy systems is to reach 
agreement on what the benchmarking process will be about. Establishing 
benchmarking groups of entities with similar systems (similar welfare state regimes 
for instance) can reduce that problem. 
 
 
2.3 (International) benchmarking: Pitfalls 
 
In all three types of public sector benchmarking it is possible to make comparisons 
across national borders, but international benchmarking is most likely in 
benchmarking of policies and/or policy systems. Such international or global 
benchmarking is without any doubt the most complicated type of benchmarking there 
is. The following three main problems can be discerned (see Cox and Thompson, 
1998: 13 and Groenendijk, 2008: 16 for a general overview of pitfalls in 
benchmarking): 
a. Cooperation-problems. Benchmarking at the macro level (i.e. at the international 
level) is essentially a consensual process as it involves democratic organisations 
and/or sovereign states (Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004:321).  In some 
fields collaboration between countries is not problematic, but often there will be 
interdependencies (in some cases even competition) between countries, putting 
pressures on cooperative benchmarking; 
b. Problems related to the choice of criteria and indicators. Policies cannot easily be 
defined in terms of input and output, and performance is affected by national 
particularities as well as international trends, which complicates the selection of 
criteria indicators. International comparison should allow for easy and stable 
monitoring, which means indicators which are easy to interpret, meaningful and 
consistent, while at the same the indicators should do justice to the complexity of 
the concepts involved (Plantenga and Hansen, 1999:352-353). Smith (2001) 
offers a fine example of this problem. Within international comparisons of 
innovation policy it is common to use gross expenditure on R&D as a proportion of 
gross domestic production (GERD/GDP) as an indicator (this indicator is also on 
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the EU short-list of structural indicators). This seems to be a straightforward 
indicator, but there is a general tendency for GERD/GDP to increase with 
increasing size of the economy, implicating that a comparison should be made 
between economies of similar size. But even then, there will be differences in R&D 
intensity across different industries, and industrial structure varies substantially 
across countries (even when they are of similar size). In short: the GERD/GDP 
indicator is not very informative. 
c. Transfer-problem. A simple transfer of best practices is often impossible due to 
different national structures, institutional environments and societal preferences 
(Plantenga and Hansen, 1999:352-353) 
 
 
The last problem has been addressed in more detail the literature on policy transfer. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) make a distinction between three types of policy transfer. 
Voluntary policy transfer is primarily motivated by dissatisfaction of policy-makers 
with existing policy arrangements and can be characterised as ‘lesson-drawing’. Direct 
coercive transfer occurs when one government compels another to adopt a certain 
policy. Indirect coercive transfer arises when the presence of externalities or 
functional interdependencies leads to joint action on the part of policy makers. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have also identified three potential risks in the process of 
policy transfer, which arise due to what Strassheim (2001: 4, following Rose) has 
called the inability to resist the “Siren Call” of best practices. First, there is the 
uninformed transfer, where policy-makers ignore that a specific policy measure did 
not only result in positive outcomes but also had negative impacts in other areas. 
Second, we have the incomplete transfer, which might occur if countries which copy a 
successful policy program overlook the role of a specific institutional set up which 
exists in another country. Thirdly, there is the inappropriate transfer, which occurs if 
the success of a policy or policy measure is based on a country’s specific values and 
norms. 
As to the actual contents of the transfer, there are a number of possibilities (Dolowitz, 
2003: 104). Policy-makers can completely copy policies, they can mix policies with 
their own, they can pick up the core idea or concept, or they can simply be inspired 
by policies in other jurisdictions. Another possibility is that these policies show them 
what not to do. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have made an additional distinction 
between the transferring of policies at large (broader statements of intention) and the 
transferring of programs (the specific means of the course of action used to 
implement policies). These distinctions largely coincide with those offered in the 
policy-learning literature. Learning can refer to policy instruments, to policies as a 
whole, and to policy paradigms. Learning about instruments can be labelled thin 
learning because it does not change the actor’s preferences, as is the case with thick 
learning (see Radaelli, 2003c, referring to Checkel, and Rose, 2001, on learning 
lessons from abroad). 
 
Table 1 brings together the major pitfalls in international benchmarking, clustered 
along the lines suggested by Plantenga and Hansen (1999). 
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Table 1: Pitfalls in international benchmarking 
Cluster Background conditions Resulting in pitfall 
Choice of 
benchmarking 
approach 
International benchmarking can only 
be done on a consensual basis, no 
coercion, 
(1) Mismatch: Choice for hierarchical, 
disciplinary standards and/or results 
(functional) benchmarking without 
corresponding coercion mechanisms 
Multitude of relevant criteria and 
objectives (inherent to complex 
policies and policy systems) 
(2) Pick-and-mix approach to benchmarking 
 
 
Disagreement on criteria due to 
national diversity in preferences 
 
(3) Construction of common objectives is 
disguised as benchmarking 
 
Choice of peers/partners is 
institutionally determined 
 
(4) Inclusion of irrelevant benchmarking 
partners 
 
Selection of 
criteria, 
indicators 
 
 
Data availability problems (5a) Over-reliance on indicators that are 
easily available, but may not be relevant to 
the criteria at hand  
(5b)Over-reliance on quantitative data 
Complexity of policies and policy 
systems, limited amount of indicators 
taken into account 
(6a) Uninformed transfers 
 
 
Complexity of policy systems, and 
diversity in national institutional 
contexts 
(6b) Incomplete transfers 
Policy transfer 
 
 
Diversity of preferences (6c) Inappropriate transfers 
 
 
2.4 Concepts of peer review and peer pressure 
 
Peer review, as well as peer pressure – which can be considered to be an element of 
peer review – show large commonalities with benchmarking. Both concepts are about 
mutual learning and improvement towards a best practice. (International) peer review 
can be considered to be a systematic examination of a policy of a certain state by 
other states, with the goal of helping the examined state to improve its performance 
within that policy field. Participation is considered to be voluntarily and the whole 
process relies mainly on mutual trust of the participating countries. The result 
commonly is a report in which accomplishments and shortfalls of the country are 
spelled out, and recommendations are made (Pagani, 2002: 4-5). In principle, every 
peer review process has its own procedure; however it is possible to identify a 
common pattern, consisting of three phases: preparation, consultation and 
assessment (OECD, 2003: 3). 
(International) peer pressure arises from the possibility of having (formal) 
recommendations and informal dialogue by the peer countries, from public scrutiny, 
comparisons and in some cases even ranking among countries and – maybe the most 
important aspect – the impact of all the above on domestic public opinion, national 
administrations and policy makers (Pagani, 2002: 4). 
 
 
 
3. OECD and EU benchmarking and peer review 
 
From the previous section it follows that a description of the use of B&PR tools by the 
OECD and the EU should focus on the general application of B&PR tools and the way 
they can be typified according to types of (public sector) benchmarking as set out in 
subsections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4. Secondly, we will pay attention to the underlying 
motivation for the use of B&PR tools and the context within they are used. 
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3.1 Benchmarking and peer review by the OECD 
 
 
3.1.1 Application of B&PR tools by the OECD 
 
In its application of B&PR tools the OECD works from well-defined and tested 
procedures. A clearly formulated aim of OECD B&PR is to go beyond simple 
comparison of data and therefore B&PR processes follow a rigorous structure plan. 
This plan can be subdivided into four phases (OECD, 2002a: 3ff). 
 
1. Planning and defining the area of study 
This phase serves the purpose of agreeing upon objectives, establishing definitions 
and clearly documenting the structure of the study. In this phase the selection of 
appropriate benchmarking partners also takes place; in principle all OECD members 
could be included, but the actual selection is made on a case-by-case basis. Although 
in some policy fields OECD B&PR are recurrent and re-iterative (like with the 
Economic Surveys of individual countries), in principle B&PR is carried out as a one-off 
exercise, but following the same strict OECD format. The policy fields that are covered 
by OECD B&PR are diverse, ranging from educational policies and practices to 
environmental performance, from development assistance to decentralization 
practices, and from regulatory reform to labour market policies. 
 
2. Collecting, structuring and evaluating data 
The search for adequate indicators is based on a fixed and comprehensive 
methodology, in order to secure comparability. This phase includes the identification 
of best performers. 
One of the main features of OECD B&PR is that benchmarking and peer review go 
hand-in-hand and can not really be distinguished. Taken together they are commonly 
refereed to as ‘reviews’. All reviews of the OECD take place under the main 
responsibility of the OECD Secretariat and its appr. 200 committees. The role of the 
Secretariat can vary, but at a minimum it involves organising meetings and providing 
continuity between individual reviews (Mitchell, 2003: 8). 
Often some OECD members serve as examiner countries whereas others are the 
reviewed countries. The role of the examiners is to represent the collective body in 
the early stages of the process and to provide guidance in the collective debate itself. 
Their tasks include the examination of documentation, participation in discussions 
with the reviewed country and the Secretariat, and a lead speaker role in the debate 
within the collective body (Pagani, 2002: 10). The reviewed country has the duty to 
co-operate with the examiners and the Secretariat, by fixing documents and data 
available, responding to questions and requests for self- assessment, facilitating 
contacts and hosting on-site visits. 
 
3. Reviewing and revaluating policy domains to identify effective approaches 
This phase includes identification of best practices. It goes beyond simple comparison 
of indicators as it deals with the possible factors underlying differences in 
performance. A best practice can be identified only within the context at hand.  
The OECD considers a review of the outcomes to be absolutely necessary, to identify 
useful benchmarks. Therefore preliminary country reports are set up and presented 
for discussions at committee meetings (Pacolet, Coudron and Marchal, 2002: 11). 
Along with that goes the possibility for the reviewed country to respond to comments 
and questions from the other delegates.  
 
4. (Final) reporting 
Final findings are reported so adaptation of policies is possible in individual countries. 
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Example: the OECD’s Economic Surveys 
The Economic Surveys of individual OECD members are conducted very 12 to 18 
months (Mitchell, 2003: 8). The B&PR process is largely coordinated by one of the 
OECD committees, the Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC). Every 
Economic Survey has the objective of promoting better understanding of a country’s 
situation and key challenges, enriching the policy debate domestically and 
internationally, and issuing policy recommendations to improve the country ´s 
performance (OECD, 2002b: 4). In the investigation phase, the OECD sets up written 
questionnaires, which are sent to the main officials – usually officials from involved 
ministries, experts, key economic players et cetera – who are encouraged to provide 
written responses and relevant background material. That is followed by on-site visits 
of OECD officials, who hold discussions with each recipient of a questionnaire 
(Mitchell, 2003: 28). The Secretariat then prepares so called draft Surveys, which are 
issued to all members of the EDRC three weeks before the review meeting. The draft 
Survey usually comprises assessment and recommendations, recent trends and 
prospects, and macroeconomic policy requirements as well as an overview of 
structural policy developments, key challenges and priorities, and implementations of 
structural reforms. 
Subsequently the actual review starts. The OECD appoints examiners based on the 
following principles (OECD, 2002b: 9): 
- reciprocal relationship between examiners and members under review are not 
desirable 
- two G7 countries must not examine each other; 
- for G7 countries and if possible also for other countries, one examining state 
should be from the EU and one from outside of the EU.  
The OECD Secretariat, the chair of the EDRC and the examiners prepare a “Questions 
for Discussion Note” in which they identify key themes around which the discussion is 
organised. The note is made available to the country under review and the other 
members at the same time. The objectives of the examination stage are assessing the 
economic situation and policies, formulating recommendations, with a hint to previous 
surveys, providing guidance to the OECD secretariat for revising the draft survey 
conclusions of the peer group and identifying recommendations relevant to other 
members of the OECD (OECD, 2002b: 11). The peer group in the examination stage 
is composed of the examiners and the EDRC. The peer group examination takes place 
over one day, in two sessions of approximately three hours each. Finally, the EDRC 
chair orally presents the conclusions to the major policy issues and the most 
important changes on the draft survey, which is later turned into a final Economic 
Survey. 
 
How does all this relate to the typology set in the previous section?   
Like most international benchmarking OECD B&PR deals with policies and policy 
systems. OECD B&PR can be understood as bottom-up/voluntary, external and 
cooperative benchmarking. It is voluntary benchmarking because countries are 
involved in the decision which countries are to be reviewed in the various processes; 
involvement does not automatically follow from membership or from clauses in the 
OECD Convention and its protocols. Involvement largely depends on mutual trust 
between the member states and shared confidence in the process (Mitchell, 2003: 
27ff). It is external benchmarking because countries aim at learning from one another 
(and primarily not to enhance the OECD as an economic area) and the benchmarking 
takes place on an international stage. The benchmarking is cooperative because there 
is no competition (for resources) among the participating states; the benchmarking is 
clearly aimed at policy learning. 
OECD benchmarking can be called close to generic, even when it deals with specific 
policy fields. The process of information procurement is very detailed and scientific. It 
takes into account as much information concerning the examined policy field as 
possible, both qualitative and quantitative. The OECD combines results and process 
benchmarking (OECD, 2002a: 9). 
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3.1.2 Underlying motivation and context 
 
OECD B&PR is very much in line with the origin and objectives of the OECD. Its 
precursor, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), was 
established in 1947 to distribute resources as part of the Marshall Plan. That plan also 
entailed liberalisation of the heavily monopolised pre-war European markets. 
Accordingly the OEEC was in charge of assessing economic reform in the recipient 
European countries. Subsequently, in 1961, after the Marshall Plan had been fully 
executed, the OECD was established to ensure (Western) world-wide cooperation of 
industrialised countries, with member states participating in the OECD and at the 
same time keeping full independence. The objectives of the OECD (optimal economic 
development of its members, liberalisation of the flow of services and capital among 
its members, economic development and growth of less development countries, 
extension of world trade) are non-binding. As such the OECD is clearly an 
intergovernmental organisation. Member countries do not subscribe to a treaty that 
forces them to implement recommendations of the OECD. The OECD therefore has to 
rely on good arguments in order to have an influence on national policy makers 
(Noaksson and Jacobsson, 2003: 32). 
The first secretary general of the OECD, Thorkil Kristensen, has argued that the core 
work of the OECD is the continuing process of “consultation” in the sense of “regular 
discussion between officials coming from capitals, regular examinations of the policies 
of each individual Member country, studies undertaken by expert groups on problems 
of special interest, [and] formal or informal recommendations to countries” 
(Kristensen, 1967: 106). This consultation activity serves the purpose of developing a 
common value system at the level of civil servants in the OECD countries that should 
form the basis for consensually shared definitions of problems and solutions in 
economic policymaking. In this context Marcussen (2001: 1) has put forward the term 
“idea game”, to describe how the OECD tries to regulate with the use of information 
exchange and persuasion. “[It is] the idea game being a question about formulating, 
transferring, selling, and teaching, not formal regulation, but principled or causal 
beliefs helping to constrain or enable certain types of social behaviour within the 
OECD area”. Marcussen (2001: 1ff) describes four roles of the OECD in this idea 
game. First, the OECD plays the role of an ideational artist, insofar as it formulates 
and diffuses new policy ideas. Secondly, the OECD acts as an ideational agent, which 
picks up ideas that are prevalent among (some of) its members. Thirdly, the OECD 
plays the role of an ideational agency, which means that it adopts ideas and wishes 
that already exist among the member states, re-works them and then are re-sells 
them to the member states. Finally, the OECD operates as an international idea 
broker, that helps national civil servants to meet among each other, promotes 
supportive surroundings and establishes meetings. 
Often it is argued that the OECD is an expert organisation rather than a political 
organisation (as the EU is). The OECD surely tries to de-politicise its benchmarking 
and peer review as much as possible. Moreover, the administrative set-up of the 
OECD is such that its political body, the Council, which consists of finance, trade and 
foreign ministers of the member states, is not involved in actual B&PR procedures, 
although it formally issues the OECD’s recommendations. The Council takes decisions 
on the OECD budget, on taking in new members and observers, as well as on the 
overall OECD strategy. The OECD Secretariat appears to be the main driver of B&PR 
processes, with the largest part of the practical work being undertaken by the 
numerous OECD committees.  
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3.2 EU B&PR as part of the OMC 
 
3.2.1 Application of B&PR tools by the EU 
 
As such, comparing member states within the EU is not a new activity. From the 
outset of the Communities, comparative overviews have been made in numerous 
policy fields. A more comprehensive approach developed however only in the 1990s, 
dealing with the competitiveness of the EU and its member states. This approach 
involved the periodical collection of data for quantitative indicators, and the use of 
these indicators in ‘learning’ processes, in cooperation with (private sector) 
businesses, building on the work by the Round Table of European Industrialists. From 
this cooperation developed the European Company Benchmarking Forum (ECBF). 
Another development was that of the Trend Chart on Innovation in Europe, which is 
now the EU innovation expert centre, in charge of (among other things) the European 
innovation scoreboard. Shortly, the EU has a firm background in quantitative 
comparative analysis and benchmarking in the fields of competitiveness and 
innovation. 
However, the birth of the more comprehensive OMC must be placed at the time the 
European Council negotiated the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). To flank the Stability 
and Growth Pact, France wanted the EU to get much more involved in the 
coordination of member states’ employment policies. The use of prevailing 
instruments for such coordination (a. turning it into a common EU policy, b. 
legislation for harmonisation) was not acceptable for most of the other member states 
(especially Germany and the United Kingdom), and the EU had to resort to ‘soft’ 
coordination by means of guidelines and peer review. This coordination became 
known as the Luxembourg- and Cologne-processes, named after the two Council 
meetings in 1997 and 1999 where this ‘soft’ coordination of employment policies was 
further developed. The term ‘open coordination’ was first introduced at the Lisbon 
summit of 2000. There are however differences between the use of ‘traditional’ soft 
law within the EU on the one hand and the OMC on the other hand (Borrás and 
Jacobsson, 2004: 188-189), the most important ones being the political rather than 
administrative nature of the OMC, its ownership (resting with the Council), the 
inclusion of social actors, and its orientation to learning processes.  
 
Although ‘open’ and ‘coordination’ are not defined in the Presidency conclusions of the 
2000 Lisbon Council Meeting, a number of relevant elements of the OMC came to the 
fore (Radaelli, 2003a: 15): a. guidelines, b. indicators, c. benchmarking and sharing 
of best practices, d. multi-lateral surveillance, e. iterative process, f. implementation 
through domestic policy and legislation (no EU legislation needed). 
In its most comprehensive form the OMC is applied using all these components. 
Following – but deviating slightly from - Radaelli (2003a, 2003c), the applications of 
the OMC can be broadly categorized as follows. The first group of applications of the 
OMC includes policies where the OMC is the main working method, and where the 
OMC encompasses most or all of the elements listed above. This category consists of 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) and the coordination of policies on social inclusion. The second category 
consists of applications that currently use some but not all of the core elements of the 
OMC: innovation & RTD policies, pension policies, education, eEurope (information 
society), environmental policies, asylum and immigration policies, and public health. 
 
The OMC generally starts with the formulation of (general and/or specific) guidelines, 
followed by the agreement on indicators. This is the format used in the earlier BEPGs 
and the EES, and in the current Integrated Guidelines 2008-2010. In the area of 
social inclusion up until 2001 member states brought forward their own indicators; 
starting with the plan for 2003 they are requested to use uniform primary and 
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secondary indicators, which can be supplemented by optional tertiary indicators 
tailored to the specifics of each member state. 
In innovation policy, the OMC is mainly about indicators. Member states can use the 
information offered by the European innovation scoreboard (which consists of 17 
indicators in the four fields of 1. human resources, 2. knowledge creation, 3. 
transmission and application of knowledge, and 4. innovation finance, output and 
markets; Löwe, 2003:6) to their own discretion in policy formulation. Kaiser and 
Prange (2004) have labelled this the horizontal dimension of the OMC in innovation 
policy. Next to this horizontal dimension we have a vertical dimension: on the basis of 
these activities member states can discuss common European guidelines for national 
and regional R&D policies. This vertical dimension is predominant in pension policy 
where member states present information without prior agreement on indicators in 
national strategy reports, and use the discussion on these reports to formulate 
common objectives for policy. 
  
Differences between the various OMC-applications can be discerned regarding the 
kind of peer review that takes place, and the possibilities for peer pressure. 
Evaluation of national plans is common in most applications, with the exception of 
pension policy and innovation policy. In pension policy there are no national action 
plans but national strategy reports that are not extensively evaluated. Innovation 
policy is aimed at the dissemination of best practices using scoreboards and reports 
rather than the formal evaluation of national plans. But even with the Integrated 
Guidelines and national action plans, one should not get the wrong idea about the 
scrupulosity of the evaluation. For instance, the review process within the EES 
consists of a one-hour session for each member state, in which its national plan is 
presented, reviewed (by two other member states) and discussed (Mosher and 
Trubek, 2003:78). 
Within the framework of the Integrated Guidelines there is the possibility for the 
Council to issue recommendations to member states that do not comply with the 
guidelines. The Council has to decide on such recommendations by QMV (and the 
same goes for the decision to make the recommendation public). The idea behind 
these recommendations is clear: naming and shaming; the OMC is sometimes 
referred to as ‘regulation by embarrassment’. Over the last years we have however 
witnessed a rather generous use of recommendations, both of common 
recommendations (addressed at all member states) and of specific country 
recommendations, which has definitely taken the edge off this type of peer pressure. 
The use of B&PR as means of fiscal policy surveillance within EMU is again different 
from other applications. In this case B&PR is linked to the possibility to issue 
sanctions; with the 2005 reform of the Stability & Growth Pact B&PR in this field has 
become more generic and takes into account more of the individual countries’ 
context. 
 
The involvement of various actors also varies from one OMC-application to another. 
As far as the EU-institutions are concerned, the Commission and the Council are the 
dominant actors, without any real role for European Parliament. The actual Councils 
that are involved are the Ecofin-Council, the Social Affairs and Labour Council, and –
for innovation policy- the Competitiveness Council. For the Integrated Guidelines the 
Economic Policy Committee, the Employment Committee, and the Social Protection 
Committee assist these Councils. Within the EES and the OMC on social inclusion, 
social partners and/or NGOs are involved. 
 
How can we typify OMC B&PR? 
OMC-benchmarking is generally presented as a bottom-up, voluntary, and open 
process, tailored to the particularities of member states. Member states are in the 
centre of the process and ‘own’ it. OMC-benchmarking thus is external and 
cooperative: it is about learning from others. It is as comprehensive as possible, i.e. 
as close to generic benchmarking as possible, in order to take into account all 
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relevant factors, and it combines results and process benchmarking using both 
quantitative and qualitative indicators. It de-politicises policy problems and it 
enhances a problem-oriented way of pursuing policies. This is the normative image of 
OMC-benchmarking that has been put forward by both Council and Commission, and 
which has some followers in the literature (Vandenbroucke, 2002; De la Porte, 2002; 
De la Porte and Pochet, 2002, De la Porte, Pochet and Room, 2001). In this view EU 
OMC B&PR is rather similar to OECD B&PR. 
But there is another view in which OMC-benchmarking actually also is internal 
benchmarking, with the EU being the relevant organisation, and member states being 
the benchmarked units. In this view it is a top-down process, owned by Council and 
Commission, with a compulsory flavour to it, in which standards are set rather than 
processes are analysed. OMC-benchmarking is aimed at convergence, for lack of 
proper harmonisation. OMC-benchmarking is functional, as it tends to focus on very 
specific and limited quantitative economic indicators. It is competitive because of the 
functional interdependencies between units (member states) in the policy fields in 
which benchmarking takes place. It is a highly political process, dealing with high-
level political coordination. 
 
 
3.2.2 Underlying motivation and context 
 
The emergence of the OMC in policy areas where more traditional alternative modes 
of policy coordination (or: governance) were not acceptable results from two main 
potential benefits of using the OMC. First, the OMC allows policy initiatives to be 
adapted to the diverse institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national 
circumstances in the EU member states. It highly accommodates diversity. Secondly, 
the OMC has great potential for policy-learning, which is especially relevant for policy 
areas where member states may be unsure of what path to take and/or which 
instruments to use. The OMC organises and institutionalises cross-national learning. 
Next to these potential benefits, there is the overall aim of applying the OMC: 
achieving greater convergence towards reaching the Lisbon objective. Clearly there is 
a tension between diversity and learning on the one hand and targeting for 
convergence and EU wide results on the other hand (Wincott, 2003: 536, 539), which 
may explain why most of the early assessments of the application of the OMC so far 
are not entirely favourable.  
These two faces of OMC-benchmarking are symptoms of a more general endemic 
tension from which the OMC suffers, and which is threefold (Radaelli, 2003c): the 
OMS seeks to mute politics ánd to encourage high-level political coordination. The 
OMC seeks to facilitate bottom-up learning ánd to steer learning processes from 
above. It tries to encourage cooperative learning ánd to spawn the dynamics of 
competitive learning. As a diversity-accommodating, bottom-up policy-learning device 
OMC-benchmarking does not work, however. Participation of member states is 
limited; there is hardly any vertical flow of information and ideas. At best the OMC 
has acted as a catalyst for policy paradigm discussions in the field of employment and 
social policies, facilitating the formulation of common objectives. As a convergence-
enforcing device, the OMC is not likely to be effective either, for lack of sanctions. 
 
To put it differently, within the EU B&PR is used for different reasons, which we can 
by and large group into three different categories (Groenendijk, 2008: 25-26): 
- horizontal policy learning (in singular policy fields); 
- surveillance (as in the fiscal surveillance within EMU); 
- vertical steering for EU wide objectives (as part of the Lisbon Agenda, by means of 
the Integrated Guidelines). 
 
 
 
GROENENDIJK = EU AND OECD BENCHMARKING AND PEER REVIEW COMPARED = EUCE, HALIFAX, APRIL 26-28, 2009 
14 
 
4. EU and OECD benchmarking and peer review compared 
 
In this section we compare the use of B&PR tools by the OECD and the EU, with a 
special emphasis on how both organisations deal with the pitfalls discussed in 
subsection 2.3. 
 
As far the relationship between benchmarking one the one hand and peer 
pressure/review on the other hand is concerned, it is clear that there is a significant 
difference between the OECD and the EU. Within OECD B&PR benchmarking and peer 
review are inherently linked, with peer review being the overall activity of which 
benchmarking is a part. In the EU, generally, benchmarking activities (choice of 
indicators, collection of data, ranking of countries) seem to be the core activity. Only 
within some OMC applications does peer review play a part, but the actual 
arrangements for peer review seem to be far less extensive in the EU than in the 
OECD. Both organisations have in common that peer pressure is applied in a limited 
sense. 
The object of B&PR is similar for both organisations: policies and policy systems. The 
type of B&PR is however different due to the fact that EU B&PR in our view is an ill-
defined mix of different types of B&PR. The differences, as the follow from the 
previous section, are listed in table 2. 
In the final row of this table the underlying objectives of the use of B&PR are 
mentioned. The most important difference between the OECD and the EU in this 
respect is that the OECD has a single objective (horizontal policy learning) whereas in 
the EU a mix of objectives can be discerned. 
 
Table 2: OECD and EU B&PR compared 
B&PR aspect OECD EU 
Relationship between 
benchmarking and peer 
review 
Peer review is the core activity 
of which benchmarking is a 
part 
Benchmarking (indicators, data, ranking) is 
the core activity, limited peer review 
Peer pressure Limited Limited 
Object of B&PR Policies 
Policy systems 
Policies 
Policy systems 
Type of B&PR Bottom-up/voluntary 
External 
Cooperative 
Generic 
Results + process 
De-politicised 
Bottom-up/voluntary 
External 
Cooperative 
Generic 
Results + process 
De-politicised 
Top-down, coercive 
Internal 
Competitive 
Functional 
Standards 
Politicised 
Underlying motivation 
& context 
Single objective: 
Horizontal policy learning 
Mixed objectives: 
- horizontal policy learning 
- surveillance 
- vertical steering for EU wide objectives 
 
If we now turn to the pitfalls as discussed in section 2.3, we can –tentatively- assess 
whether the OECD and/or the EU have become trapped or not. 
It is clear that the EU suffers from a mismatch between the underlying objectives of 
B&PR activities and the type of B&PR used (pitfall 1). This is not particularly true for 
EMC B&PR applications in singular policy fields like health, education and innovation & 
RTD, but it is true for those applications in which either surveillance (linked with 
possible sanctions) or vertical policy coordination (for EU wide objectives) is aimed 
for. 
Regarding the pitfall of a pick-and-mix approach to B&PR (pitfall 2), both the OECD 
and the EU deal with complex policies and policy systems and use a multitude of 
policy objectives and indicators. With the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 
and the introduction of the Integrated Guidelines some improvement has been made 
in this regard in the EU. On the other hand, coordination of reviews and safeguarding 
continuity between reviews may be better developed within the OECD. 
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Within the OECD B&PR format a clear difference is made between the planning and 
definition stage of the B&PR activities and the actual collection of data and the actual 
benchmarking. Within the EU some OMC B&PR applications do not seem to surpass 
the stage of discussing relevant policy objectives and indicators (pitfall 3). 
The choice of benchmarking partners is institutionally determined in both the OECD 
and the EU. However, because the OECD is slightly larger and deals with the problem 
of composition of reviewed countries explicitly in its B&PR format, it is less likely that 
it will include irrelevant benchmarking partners than in the EU (pitfall 4). Moreover, 
the inclusion within EU OMC B&PR of surveillance and vertical policy coordination does 
not allow for limitation of B&PR activities to subsets of member states, but it can add 
to the possibility of comparing countries that are not really worth comparing. 
Another difference between the OECD and the EU is that the EU relies very heavily on 
statistical data as supplied by EUROSTAT and national statistics agencies, whereas the 
OECD more often uses autonomous data collection methods like questionnaires 
(pitfalls 5a and 5b). 
Because of the latter issue uninformed and incomplete transfers are more likely to 
occur within the EU than within the OECD. Inappropriate transfers are more likely to 
occur in the EU than in the OECD because of the top-down and quasi-compulsory 
nature of some B&PR applications within the EU. 
 
Table 3: OECD and EU: Pitfalls, trapped or not? 
Pitfall OECD EU 
(1) Mismatch: Choice for hierarchical, disciplinary standards 
and/or results (functional) benchmarking without corresponding 
coercion mechanisms 
No Yes 
(2) Pick-and-mix approach to benchmarking Possibly Possibly 
(3) Construction of common objectives is disguised as 
benchmarking 
No Yes 
(4) Inclusion of irrelevant benchmarking partners Less likely More likely 
(5a) Over-reliance on indicators that are easily available, but may 
not be relevant to the criteria at hand  
(5b)Over-reliance on quantitative data 
No Yes 
(6a) Uninformed transfers Less likely More likely 
(6b) Incomplete transfers Less likely More likely 
(6c) Inappropriate transfers Less likely More likely 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
What can the EU learn from the OECD in the field of B&PR? 
 
The main implication of our findings is that if the EU uses B&PR as a means of 
information exchange, aimed at policy learning, it can skirt around some of the pitfalls 
of international benchmarking, as shown by the OECD, the most important one being 
the mismatch-pitfall. Benchmarking for horizontal policy learning should be 
organised as a voluntary, cooperative external process, with a focus on process 
benchmarking. Ownership of the process should rest with the member states; the role 
of the EU Council can be very limited (cf. the limited role of the OECD Council), the 
role of the Commission should be facilitating and coordinating (cf. the role of the 
OECD Secretariat). Here the need for uniform, quantitative indicators is rather 
limited; questionnaires and on-site visits could add considerable value. Benchmarking 
should not be done EU-wide, but should be done in benchmarking groups of member 
states that are largely similar in the policy field in question (‘enhanced benchmarking 
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cooperation’). A uniform and rigorous EU review format, like the one used in the 
OECD, should be developed in for reasons of cross-review continuity. 
 
The second possible purpose of benchmarking is vertical policy coordination (as part 
of the Lisbon Agenda for growth and jobs). Vertical policy coordination has been 
problematic. For the case of innovation policy Kaiser and Prange (2004: 261) have 
argued that this is due to three specific characteristics: the multi-level character of 
innovation policies, the diversity of innovation systems, and the highly competitive 
character of the policy area. As two out of these three characteristics are shared by 
policies on social inclusion, and probably all three are relevant to employment policy 
and other economic policies, the observation made by Kaiser and Prange about the 
difficulties in bringing about vertical policy transfers may have a more general 
meaning. In order to be effective benchmarking for vertical policy learning 
should be organised similar to benchmarking for horizontal learning, but it should be 
more geared at the dissemination of best practices. It should not be organised within 
member states, but EU-wide, differentiated as much as possible for specific policy 
fields. Again, this is external, cooperative benchmarking on a voluntary basis, the 
organisation of which could be put in the hands of specialised EU-agencies or private 
organisations. 
The third set of possible purposes of benchmarking has got to do with progress 
monitoring and multilateral surveillance. Benchmarking for monitoring and 
surveillance should have a compulsory edge to it, without it being truly hierarchical 
or disciplinary. This is internal standards benchmarking, owned and driven by the 
Council, building on clearly defined standards (like the 3 per cent GDP ceiling in the 
SGP, or the ban of harmful business taxation) or aimed at well-defined and coherent 
policy goals (like some of the ones used in the Lisbon strategy and Integrated 
Guidelines). EU-wide-indicators should be uniform and quantitative. According to 
Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson (2004: 324) this type of benchmarking will be 
fairly unproblematic depending on the ambitions and the consensus underlying the 
target-setting process. But even with consensus on objectives and targets, 
enforceability may be problematic, as our experiences with the SGP have shown. 
Especially in the area of social policies benchmarking for monitoring and surveillance 
should be additional to a framework with clear (minimum) standards, which ultimately 
are enforceable, in line with Scharpf’s (2002) argument for combining the OMC with 
(framework) directives. In this regard, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is often mentioned 
as an indirect coercive mechanism within EU B&PR (failure to succeed will invariably 
unleash stronger policy instruments). As Borrás and Jacobsson (2004: 195-196) 
rightfully argue this mechanism is not really relevant to the OMC because of the 
explicit political statement of avoiding transferring further powers to Brussels in the 
fields where the OMC operates. If stronger policy instruments had been acceptable 
they would have been used in the first place. Still, it is conceivable that the OMC 
works as a passerelle towards other coordination methods (Telò, 2002:254-255) 
because application of the OMC in certain policy field has changed the initial 
characteristics thereby changing the balance of pros and cons of stronger 
coordination. 
 
 
-0-0-0-0-0- 
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